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POLICY BRIEF

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY, CABO DELGADO INSURGENCY AND CONSEQUENCES FOR MOZAMBIQUE – BETWEEN THE BOOM AND THE RESOURCE CURSE

How to avoid the double resource curse?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This policy brief is the result of a round table debate that brought together multiple actors and representatives of Mozambican CSOs in order to discuss, in a multidisciplinary perspective, some aspects inherent to the discovery and exploitation of enormous resources such as coal in Tete and LNG in Cabo Delgado as an example. The resource boom that the country is experiencing poses enormous governance challenges and calls for greater intervention by actors such as CSOs, academia, religion and the public. An open and inclusive debate with a view to a broader understanding and the search for synergies can be an important step towards resource governance and the elaboration of sustainable policies that can make this boom a real blessing for the country and never a curse like recent events tend to corroborate.

This document brings the understanding of relevant actors in the constructive, critical and analytical debate that OXFAM with its implementing partners and cooperation agencies, through its pillar on the governance of the extractive industry are carrying out to better intervene, include and advise government and policy makers. It also contains a list of analyzes and recommendations on how to face the current challenges, addressing socio-economic and political bases that meet the aspirations of the country and the region.

Introduction

The insurgency experienced in the northern province of Cabo Delgado is target of several reflections and debates not only by the government but also by CSOs, Academia, Religion, the public and the international community. A phenomenon that goes beyond the political–military field and penetrates the social field because more than a political and economic issue, the attacks involve an entire society.

From the date of the first attacks until today, there are more than 800000 IDPs and an unconfirmed number of deaths. The spread of attacks and the rising presence of insurgents in districts and towns and closer to the gas projects has brought enormous concern about the future of LNG exploration projects and, above all, about the postponement of economic projections made by the Government of the Republic of Mozambique.

Several theorists associate the conflict in Cabo Delgado with the discovery and exploration of gas from Palma. However, given the closed context and lack of evidence, it is difficult to establish a direct relationship and correlation between the two situations that contribute and support the curse theory.

The purpose of this policy brief is to bring some historical elements about the governance of natural resources in Mozambique and help to understand the latest cycles of governance. This historical perspective can help to understand how the country reached its current stage. We deem this discussion relevant in our thematic area, as development projects cannot be thought of without political stability; one cannot think of providing humanitarian aid without security; nor can one think about fighting poverty without having space to implement sustainable public policies.

The policy provides a structural and exhaustive reflection on some of the aspects well known by many but analyzed and discussed from a different point of view. It also provides a list of well–founded and evidence–based recommendations that reflect the real need and paths we must follow as a country.

It is an open–ended document and does not bring final conclusions, as it is the result of a roundtable that will call for more theoretical reflections and practical actions so that it can be followed by activism aimed at changing attitudes and advocacy with the government.

Background and Problem

Reflection on the issue of governance of the extractive industry cannot and should not be disconnected or dissociated from the context experienced in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. There is no evidence that clearly indicates the link between the discovery and exploitation of resources and the emergence of conflicts (bar for its timing). This situation initially was designated as ethnic-religious, and evolved into a kind of social discontent motivated by exclusion from participating in development projects and which finally, violent extremism that has cost human lives not only to that part of the country but to Mozambique as a whole.

Despite initial efforts by the government to minimize the critical situation in Cabo Delgado, recent events forced a more pragmatic decision-making and military intervention to combat this evil. The hiring of Russian and South African mercenaries to face the increasing level of domination and occupation of the surrounding districts of the Afungi Peninsula was followed by a request for support to the SADC troika and the consequent arrival of Rwandese, South African and Zimbabwean troops and from other countries like Angola for example.

Unconfirmed numbers point to around 800,000 displaced due to the violent conflict that has lasted since 2017. Cabo Delgado is today the scene of a faceless war that, in addition to sowing grief and pain, delays the dream of gas exploration and development in the country. Humanitarian agencies work is conditioned by the high level of access and lack of security in the province; The high secrecy surrounding the conflict exacerbated the persecution of the press and the closing of civic space; The dignity of refugees is violated at every moment and girls and women are having the most negative exposure, as reports point to violation of their basic rights not only by insurgents, but also by the defense and national security forces.

There are besieged areas in Cabo Delgado province and a tremendous silence on the part of the legal authorities. This leads us to question the present and future of gas exploration, the future of affected populations and the cost of military interventions by SADC and other countries.

How can these insurgent-led attacks undermine the exploitation of LNG and consequently delay the development of the largest extractive investment on the African continent, as well as its medium and long-term economic impact?

Research Overview

The research carried out to prepare the policy brief was qualitative with a focus on literature review. Due to the nature of the ToRs, the proposed and discussed objectives, the team understood that, in addition to the synthesis with the main interventions, the policy should contain recommendations adjusted to what was produced during the roundtable.

Thus, a historical and chronological research was conducted to understand the beginning and evolution of the insurgency in the north of the country. Then proceeded to the literary analysis of countries that experienced the boom in resources and the crossing of interfaces and effects arising from the presence of resources. This exercise gave us the background of Mozambique not in an isolated point of view but within a framework of resource curse, which is common in the African continent.

As a very complex topic, it is our understanding that it cannot be complete only in a literature review. However, it can provide very useful viewpoints for attacking the problem and designing conflict mitigation strategies to avoid the double resource curse and occurrence of similar events in other parts of the country.

Concept discussion

Resource curse

The abundance of natural resources in countries has been considered, in part of the literature, not as a blessing, but as a curse. Development literature from the 1950s to the 1970s interpreted the abundance of natural resources, and the specialization that resulted from it, as an obstacle to overcoming underdevelopment (**Prebisch, 1949; Singer, 1950; Hirschman, 1958; Frank, 1966; Kaldor, 1978**). This critical view of resource-based economies gained traction in the heterodox literature in the 1990s and beyond with the publication of seminal works by Sachs and Warner (1995); who sought empirical evidence about the curse. With **Authy (1993)**, these authors set up the beginning of what is known as the “resource-curse literature”, which pointed to the negative relationship between abundance of natural resources and long-term economic growth.

Internally Displaced Persons

These are people displaced within their own country, for the same reasons as a refugee, but who have not crossed an international border to seek protection. Even though they were forced to leave their homes for reasons similar to those of refugees (persecution, armed conflict, generalized violence, serious and widespread violation of human rights), internally displaced persons remain legally under the protection of their own State – even if that State is the cause of their escape¹.

Terrorism and violent extremism

Terrorism poses a major threat to international peace and security. Terrorist acts are the culmination of processes that often begin with radicalization, the formation of extremist views and the acceptance of violence as a means of transformation. As with other types of offenses, there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism, but there are several behaviors universally accepted as expressions of it. Terrorism-related offenses include the use of violence for political purposes, such as hijacking aircraft, attacking maritime vessels, using chemical or nuclear weapons against civilians, kidnapping and other forms of violence against civilians.

Terrorism itself is not a new phenomenon, but the beginning of the 21st century is being shaped by a more intense focus on this issue and an increased awareness of terrorist acts and groups².

Literature review

The Rovuma Basin is the sedimentary basin of the Rovuma River on the Mozambique-Tanzania border, located on land and at sea. The first oil exploration and data acquisition in the Mozambican part of the basin started around 1980. It was in 1983 in the Public Tender for Concession of Areas for Research and Production of Hydrocarbons that the Rovuma Onshore Area was awarded to Esso Exploitation Moçambique Limitada (operator with 50%) and its partner Shell also with 50% of participation interest.

¹ (<https://www.acnur.org/portugues>)

² (<https://www.unodc.org/e4j/pt/secondary/terrorism.html>)

Esso Exploration Moçambique Limitada executed the first prospection in the Mozambican part of the Rovuma Basin, designated Mocímboa 1, in 1986. The Mocímboa 1 hole was drilled inland (Onshore), near Mocímboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado province, at a distance of 110km southwest of the small gas discovery in Mnazi Bay, Tanzanian part of the Rovuma Basin. This hole had a dry result with some traces of gas (gas shows).

After years of intense research, in 2010 the first major discovery of this basin was announced, made through the Windjammer 2 hole, followed by other considerable discoveries of natural gas³.

The discovery of gas in the Rovuma Basin provided hope for Mozambique's much-desired economic growth and development. Early on, projections made pointed to very positive economic health and a growing number of economic gains and foreign direct investment.

These optimistic projections generated two effects for the economy: one was the spending effect, which consists of governments increasing their spending, and approving high budgets for the state based on optimistic economic projections, and of future earnings and the other is the high indebtedness of the government to satisfy the cravings of economic elites. In the case of Mozambique, we have seen both effects and a third that is not new in Africa and in the world – the resource curse, which was and is widely debated inside and outside the country, by academics, analysts, government officials and CSOs. The approval of high state budgets and unsuitability with the country's reality, the contracting of illegal debts (without the approval of Parliament) placed the country in a difficult economic situation and heightened the focus of social tension. The main donors and financiers of the State Budget announced their withdrawal and suspension of the support package to the country, and in parallel, the IMF started executing the debt contracted by the government. The so-called hidden debts are now designated sovereign debts and the people pays them through taxes.

Because of the suspension of aid to the State Budget by the main donors, the country plunged into a deep economic and social crisis.

The level of social inequalities and the gap between rich and poor have become more acute, making the urban and rural poverty focus increasingly visible. To face the already heavy budgetary situation, the government increased taxes and prices of basic needs, and once again, these measures affect the poorest part of the population.

³ (<http://www.inp.gov.mz/pt/Pesquisa-Producao/Descobertas-na-Bacia-do-Rovuma/Historia-das-Descobertas-na-Bacia-Sedimentar-do-Rovuma>)

Conflict Origin and Its Relationship with Gas Exploration

The first reports of some social, religious and ideological friction date back to mid-2012 where Islamic groups of different orientation unleashed exercises of social chaos, panic in some mosques, and were involved in small and medium-scale conflicts. Local authorities called these isolated and easily controllable cases. From 2012 to 2016, there has been an exponential growth of mosques and Islamic schools in Cabo Delgado's coastal districts – all with hostile messages to the government and the order emanating from the constitution. According to the government and the authorities, we were dealing with a police case that was easily controllable.

From 2017 onwards, there has been an increase in offensives and a change in the narrative on the part of government authorities. From religious conflicts to police cases, the situation has reached a faceless war and now we are facing violent extremism led by well-equipped forces in control of the geography of the province.

The insurgence was causing hundreds of deaths, thousands of displaced people and major casualties for the Defense and Security Forces, public and private institutions taken over by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), infrastructure destroyed. The terminology and the narrative was changing and there is a conflict with terrorist behaviors and severe insurgency where the state saw itself limited and incapable of putting an end to the situation.

Between 2020 and 2021, districts and towns in Cabo Delgado are looted and captured by terrorists. More than 800,000 displaced people, especially children, pregnant women and the elderly, and hundreds of dead.

After capturing the port and the headquarters town of Mocímboa da Praia, Quissanga, Macomia, Awassi, Nangade and other villages, the multinational Total announces the suspension of activities and the possibility of transferring the management of the gas mega project to the Mayot Islands. It was in fact during the last attack, carried out by the insurgents that the country and the world woke up to the human and humanitarian drama that is going on in Cabo Delgado.

Internally, the government deployed meetings with the SADC Troika to study possible joint interventions by the region and the world with a view to safeguarding sovereignty and saving human lives.

There is no tacit evidence on the relationship between the insurgency and the discovery and exploration of gas by TOTAL, nor a clear claim by the insurgents regarding any claim to the government – a fact that makes the conflict even more complex and difficult to judge.

Some literature states that many countries that experience the discovery of natural resources associated with weak institutional capacity and lack of political will tend to experience some type of political instability and medium and large-scale conflicts. This modus operandi aims, on the one hand, to destabilize the country's economy and allow the extraction of resources at low prices, and, on the other hand, to reinforce the monopoly of resource exploitation by the largest companies linked to extracting and mining.

With this, there is a depreciation of resources, a high indebtedness of the states to guarantee peace and stability and a large accumulation of debts arising from spending on the war.

Rovuma gas and governance challenges: From Chissano to Nyusi

Understanding the challenges of governance today implies going back and analyzing previous cycles of governance, government priorities, actions, advances and setbacks. This will enable us to understand the paths on how the country reached the current situation.

From 1975 to the present day, the country has experienced several moments ranging from the civil war, also known as the 16-year war, the signing of the Rome Agreement, the transition from mono-party to multi-party model with the holding of the first democratic elections, among others that corroborated what we are today as a country. Each of these moments is of capital importance for achieving the goals of the Mozambican state. The discovery of natural gas deposits in Cabo Delgado was a turning point at various levels in the country's governance. A turning point because, from early on, development and economic growth were assumed as the main driver of the state, with gas expected to diversify the economy.

The transition between the regime of Samora Machel and the office of Joaquim Alberto Chissano was characterized by a period of economic readjustment and rapprochement with the West, specifically with the Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A rapid economic recovery and a solid stimulus to the economy were imperative for governance – economic liberalism takes over the country's political agenda, while efforts to consolidate peace, solidify multi-party and design national medium-strategies were sought in long-term for the country.

As elements of support for this economic growth and development, the fight against absolute poverty was assumed during the government of Armando Guebuza as the standard and word of the day. Paradoxically, it was during his government that the country drastically decreased

in the evaluation of poverty in the world. It failed in the assessment of the fight against poverty and worsened governance rates with high levels of corruption and a state machine eager to obtain counterparts to the discovery of natural resources, with greater focus on Rovuma gas.

In this period of government, the country experienced the contracting of odious debts, also known as hidden debts for having been contracted without the proper endorsement of the Parliament. It is not possible to dissociate the contracting of these debts from the gas discovery in the Rovuma Basin, as the expected revenues were partially destined to cover the debts. This was the Government's expectation. Nevertheless, it was largely opposed by public and CSOs in particular – mainly by the *“I don't pay the debt even with gas”* campaign by the Public Integrity Center (CIP). In fact, as mentioned above, the debt-contracting framework and the increase in the state budget expenditure are characteristics of countries with weak or poor governance that are experiencing the so-called resource boom.

At the term of office of Armando Guebuza, a new governance cycle followed. This was believed to be promising given the context of optimism surrounding a real boom with Sasol's exploration of Pande and Temane gas, as well as prospecting in the Basin from Rovuma, from coal mining in Moatize, graphite in Balama, gemstones in Namanhumbir, heavy sands in Moma and Angoche, diamonds in Massangena and other medium-scale resources that changed the country's political geography.

Mozambique had everything in the eyes of the most incautious and this was the slogan of Filipe Jacinto Nyusi's first term. In fact, and to be honest, the cycle of governance initiated by Filipe Nyusi is a cycle that inherits a heavy political, economic and social burden. The hidden debts of which he was one of the proponents as the then Minister of Defense, were a kind of poisoned candy that undermined everything that was delivered in his inauguration speech, which by the way was quite promising.

In the first term, Mozambique lived a strong economic asphyxia that uncovered the sad social reality of the country, where the focus of rural and urban poverty became more visible. The living conditions of the ordinary citizen deteriorated due to the increase in taxes and the lack of liquidity in the national financial system to deal with the suspension of support from donors.

The social-political instability generated by attacks by the self-proclaimed RENAMO Military Junta generate social tension and discomfort as well as forced migrations of the populations of Manica and Sofala. The ghost flames of 16 years are lit and there is fear of a return to war. Quickly, because of negotiations started with the deceased leader of RENAMO – Afonso Dhlakama, the Definitive Peace Agreements were signed between Filipe Nyusi and Ossufo Momade, the current leader of RENAMO.

The attacks by the insurgents gain an unprecedented scale, and certain districts of Cabo Delgado fall into the hands of the insurgents of the self-proclaimed IS. Growing security threats from Africa's largest extractive industry project raise alarms and Total threatens to abandon the project.

Overnight, high expectations fall and the most optimistic projections start to fail. The resource curse theory finds some sense here and practical sustainability with more than necessary evidence.

The governance challenges of creating strong, transparent, capable, credible, highly responsive institutions and a legal framework capable of managing the boom never became visible and this was demonstrated on two occasions – inability to fully respond to the scandal of hidden debts and the inability to end the situation of the insurgency living in Cabo Delgado.

We are fully aware that the exercise of building a strong state and capable institutions is not feasible in 5 or even 10 years. It requires a high sense of political will and common commitment, combined efforts and medium-long-term plans.

Extractive Industry, Insurgency and Civic Space

There is a correlation between the announcement of prospecting work, the start of exploration of the Rovuma gas and the outbreak of insurgent attacks. This seems to target the main gas platform explored by Total.

As the attacks rise, government authorities have further closed access to information and events in the operational theater have become increasingly scarce. There are reports of kidnapped and disappeared journalists in full exercise of their functions. There is also a trend to use force to restrict civic space and the participation of various humanitarian actors and civil society.

On the one hand, the Covid-19 pandemic imposed certain limits on citizen action and participation. On the other hand, the state of emergency first and then the state of calamity came to condition the full exercise of the freedoms and purposes of the rule of law.

The government, political parties, CSOs, academia and public are called to openly debate the political economy of natural resources, the policies that surround them, and the paths for

managing and resolving conflict issues that may arise from this exploitation of resources (for example, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado).

The CSOs have a prominent place in deepening the reflection on the past, present and future of the country, democracy and in strengthening the processes of governance and participation in Mozambique. Sadly, this space has been gradually closed to accommodate interests and individual ambitions that undermine the country's progress.

The public advocacy provided by these organizations and the extension of the work initially reserved solely and exclusively for the government, is an asset for the construction of an increasingly inclusive Mozambique with good governance.

There are conflicting and often diverging voices about the exploitation of resources in the country, the role of governance and the management of the conflict that has lasted 4 years and that has become widespread. There is a huge silence and a feeling that the Cabo Delgado conflicts cannot come to public sphere because it involves aspects of security and state sovereignty. However, the spread of the conflict or insurgency, as we want to call it, awakened voices from inside and outside, and caused the oil company TOTAL to rethink the management of gas exploration in the country, which in itself represents a setback in projections initially made and the expected timeline in the production of vital revenues for the state coffers.

The CSOs, which have contributed a lot to the debate around the governance of natural resources, are not always welcome by the government. They are accused of interfering in political affairs in an attempt to destabilize the government's agenda. Statements and actions tend to prove that there is some discomfort in having the CSOs to denounce excesses, lack of transparency and ask for more accountability in the management of public affairs, in the fair redistribution of revenues and in the inclusion of more comprehensive policies for the country's growth. All of this leads to unrestrained attempts to limit action by the CSOs, their activists and the press, embodying the closing of the civic space that is vital for advocacy actions and influence at all levels.

Policy Recommendations

With the following recommendations, we want to make a call for action. This call will focus on three main areas that our analysis deems to be priorities: **humanitarian, governance and peacekeeping**.

These recommendations are not solely and exclusively under the responsibility of OXFAM as a non-governmental organization, that has been very supportive of governance in the country. Rather, they are recommendations that provide OXFAM a field to influence the government and policy makers to adopt policies adjusted (including the transparent implementation of the legal framework for management of resources) to the current context and to the future that is expected to be challenging.

It is our understanding, based on the contextual analysis carried out, that the conflict in Cabo Delgado will have enormous consequences for the affected communities and for the displaced who experienced horrors and saw their families abruptly separated. Unofficial figures point around 800,000 displaced since the beginning of the conflict and it is still not possible to disaggregate the sex and age group in these figures accordingly.

In addition to the economic impact that the insurgency can bring to the gas project underway in that part of the country, it is important to look at the social and human dynamics and consider them in order to avoid future problems.

The wave of displaced people from the conflict, which now numbers 800,000, has created a new problem of poverty. They are children, women, the elderly and girls who are far from their areas of origin and far from their production fields and fishing habitats. Both the government and the aid agencies are facing a human and humanitarian drama that surely will weigh on the economy and exacerbate the existing levels of poverty in the country in general and in the province in particular. Ultimately, this will generate possible secondary conflicts of a cultural, social and ethnic nature due to the scarcity of resources.

I. Humanitarian Activities

OXFAM's humanitarian action and other consortium organizations depends on the efforts to pacify Cabo Delgado province.

In highly militarized regions, the risk of closing humanitarian organizations is tremendous as they often use the humanitarian mandate to infiltrate individuals and materials that are harmful to peace building.

It is equally worrying the presence of a large peace force that will be able to take advantage of the weakness of women and girls to carry out acts of incentive to prostitution and acts of exchange of goods for sex – in situations of peace missions it is something recurrent.

OXFAM is recommended to draw up a safeguard protocol as well as training for its humanitarian workers so that all humanitarian standards are observed and that the displaced people can have support and respect for their human status and dignity. Here, gender policies and perspectives should be very well aligned so that respect for the emancipation and empowerment of women and girls is enforced.

It is also recommended a mapping of the most affected regions and a demographic survey that can indicate the origin, number, sex and ages of the displaced should begin. This data can be used, together with the resettlements created by the gas projects, to regroup families and create psychosocial monitoring programs.

II. Natural Resources Governance

The conflict and insurgency in Cabo Delgado served, among several moments, to reflect the current stage of the governance of the country's resources, on the legal framework, sustainability, effectiveness and safety in a context of little transparency.

It was clear our inability to face external and extreme events as the case of the insurgency experienced in Cabo Delgado, where districts and villages were captured and our sovereignty was severely pinched.

A country experiencing a resource boom such as Mozambique cannot and should not show this level of unpreparedness. More than extracting resources and exporting them, it is urgent to ensure the defense, security and integrity of Mozambicans, native populations in particular;

ensure inclusion in the management, and that the benefits belong to everyone and not just a handful of people.

It is important to look at the long-term sustainability of this governance and to create mechanisms⁴ to, on the one hand, capitalize revenues and manage in a transparent and inclusive manner, and on the other hand, expand the scope of investments to allow for greater diversification of the economy and less dependence on resources in the medium and long term. Some suggestions are: inclusion of academia, opposition parties, CSOs and other actors in policy-making processes and in policy monitoring; Creation of an independent sovereign fund (currently being pushed forward by CSOs) or one with little political intervention; Creation of a governance declaration headed by national CSOs.

We recommend OXFAM to influence the government to improve the current legal framework so that it is more protectionist and defends national interests; Advocate with other CSOS for a greater redistribution of gains arising from the exploitation of resources and that peaceful citizens feel empowered and part of this process – this will allow the debate around local content to be more genuine and realistic; that there are fewer spots of discontent among the population, and that, based on this openness, it is possible to invest seriously in nutrition, health and education of the population, thus reducing focuses of child malnutrition, chronic malnutrition and high maternal and postpartum infant mortality.

III. Peacekeeping

History says that in many parts of the world, the post-conflict period is often a period of difficult management and friction between displaced people, returnees and resettled people. Today's problem is Cabo Delgado and the districts close to the gas projects.

Yesterday there were outbreaks of instability in Manica and Sofala and tomorrow it could be other regions experiencing resource booms.

Talking about peacekeeping and building foundations for peace to last has never been more urgent and pressing than in recent times.

A new fact that emerged during the draft of this policy was the arrival of military personnel from Rwanda and SADC at a time when certain districts and villages were completely captured by the insurgents. The recent recapture of Mocimboa da Praia and Awasi poses a challenge

⁴ For example: 1. Inclusion of academia, opposition parties, CSOs and other actors in policy-making processes and in policy monitoring;

2. Creation of an independent sovereign fund or with little political intervention;

3. Creation of a governance declaration headed by national CSOs.

to maintain peace in order to avoid the rekindling of guerrilla outbreaks in the released areas. The modus operandi of the insurgents could change and peace could be in jeopardy and this will lead to successive delays in the exploitation of resources in a desirable way.

In a situation of massive discovery and prospection of resources as is the case in Mozambique, with focuses in Angoche and Namanhumbir, for example, in Massangena and in Balama, it is necessary to think and implement a defense and security strategy that can protect the State from certain interferences and evil events.

More than waiting to be attacked and besieged, it is important to create solid foundations to protect our citizens and our resources, influencing the line ministries and thinking ahead of events.

Taking advantage of the partnership with the European Union, we recommend, within the areas of competence and jurisdiction, OXFAM to be a leader and pioneer in this exercise of influencing for a greater capacity to protect and safeguard people and resources.

Policy alternatives

Additionally and alternatively, it is recommended to carry out research and studies on extractivism and its different approaches to serve as a matter of advocacy and influence with the government and political parties. This evidence-based advocacy can prevent the country from falling into the mistakes and fallacies that many countries have already fallen into, and can help assemble a national extractive industry governance agenda with government, academia and CSOs.

International experts, governments and sovereign fund investors can participate on these high-level studies and debates to discuss success cases from the countries in this topic. OXFAM would gain more visibility and relevance for being one of the first INGOs operating in the country to take this path. Based on its regional and global network, OXFAM can lead a process of public advocacy and influence so that Mozambique becomes a success case and not a grotesque failure in the future.

Annex

Author's biography

Celson Bahule holds a PhD in Business Ethics from Universidade São Tomás de Moçambique. He has a work experience of over 11 years in teaching, including activities in the following areas: Faculty Directorate, Head of Department and Pedagogical Coordination. His work experience also extends to consulting in Business Ethics and human resources, psycho-pedagogical training, qualifications and capacity building.

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